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We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non
linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along
two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into ￿nal production and the available
area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation
scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a
positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection
e⁄ects. We then introduce acceptability constraints and show that the intervention under
acceptability amounts to reallocate production towards ine¢ cient farmers who bene￿t
from the reform at the expense of e¢ cient producers. Last, we calibrate the model using
datas on a french watershed (Don watershed). Simulations indicate that satisfying a
high degree of acceptability does not entail high welfare losses compared to low degree of
acceptability.
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11 Introduction
The use of economic incentive instruments such as green taxes in environmental policy has
become increasingly popular in many countries and in particular in Europe. However, new
taxes are often unpopular in polluting sectors that usually prefer traditional command and
control regulation. When designing a green tax scheme, the regulator has thus to take into
account the potential losses imposed to the polluters when comparing with the pre-reform
(or status quo) situation. In other words, the design of green reforms is subject to a political
acceptability constraint.
On the one hand, the tax scheme can be designed such that no producer looses through a
reimbursement rule using lump sum transfer. This means that any polluting ￿rm would enter
voluntarily in the environmental regulation scheme given that there are no losses compared
to the status quo situation. Such a highly acceptable policy comes usually at an ine¢ ciency
cost: in order to be acceptable by everybody, the environmental regulation should not impose
too much e⁄ort. Otherwise, a high level of abatement would be too costly. On the other hand,
the government might impose the term of regulation without fearing about losses imposed
to polluters. In such a case, the strong commitment power of the government allows it to
push forward a mandatory regulation. Of course, such a political power might be limited by
laws protecting polluters￿revenues by limited liability up to a given amount. The resulting
policy would be highly e¢ cient from an environmental perspective but would gain very low
political support in the polluting industry. (ex taxe CO2, rapport OCDE)
The concern about political support for reform is particularly deep in the agricultural
sector in Europe. Rising concerns about environmental quality depressed by highly intensive
agriculture have given birth to a series of reforms relating the level of subsidy to the environ-
mental e⁄ort of farmers. Up to now, those policies have largely relied on voluntary adoptions
by farmers and have gained little success. Some have argued that o⁄ered compensations were
insu¢ cient to cover the compliance cost and that uncertainty about the durability of envi-
2ronmental voluntary programs have undermined their success. A large rate of participation
is obviously needed to attain environmental protection goals, so that ensuring this rate in a
voluntarily way might be excessively costly. This situation raises the issue of how to regulate
agricultural pollution abatement while sustaining a given level of political support.
In this paper, we consider water pollution caused by agricultural activities and we ana-
lyze how to regulate farmers￿behavior while taking into account the pro￿t potential losses
induced by the reform. Of course, it is well known that regulating agricultural pollution is
quite di¢ cult because of the non point source feature: individual emissions cannot be mea-
sured and controlled easily (see Shortle and Horan (2001) for a survey). To overcome this
di¢ culty, we consider the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution by an environmental
agency through non linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production and land. Those
variables are more easily observable than individual emissions. The population of farmers we
consider is heterogenous along two dimensions: their ability to transform inputs into ￿nal
production and the available area they possess. Productive ability is assumed to be private
information to the farmers while available area is an observable characteristic which may
be part of the regulatory scheme. Hence, private information makes self-selection necessary.
In addition, we assume that farmers￿pro￿ts are protected by limited liability such that the
reform cannot yield negative pro￿ts.
We introduce political acceptability as part of the constraints that the regulator has to take
into account. Following Lewis et al. (1989), the regulator has to satisfy a given proportion
of farmers through intervention and a farmer is satis￿ed if he does not loose from regulation
compared to the status quo situation.1 When this proportion is zero, the resulting policy is
such that the political acceptability constraint is non binding and hence it can be labelled
as a mandatory policy, which however does not allow the agency to impose negative pro￿ts
to farmers because of limited liability constraints. On the contrary, when this proportion is
1The properties induced by the use of this criterion have been rarely studied in the economic literature. A
recent exception is Demange and Geo⁄ard (2002) who analyzed the physician regulation.
3one, the policy is voluntary by its very nature as any farmer is ready to accept the reform.
Bontems et al. (2004) analyze the mandatory case in details and show that asymmetric
information yields to a larger range of less e¢ cient farmers that are induced to quit the
sector and a lower production level for any type of farmers compared to what prevails when
individual ability is perfectly known to the agency. Overall, the total level of pollution is
reduced because ￿rst the less e¢ cient and most polluting farms are shut down and second
because the remaining active farms are required to produce less intensively and therefore
pollute less compared to the pre-reform situation.
This paper is devoted to the case where the proportion of farmers who have to be satis￿ed
is strictly positive. The identity of winners is endogenous and determined by the agency as
part of the optimal policy. Two regulatory regimes are identi￿ed. When the required level
of acceptability is low, the regulatory pattern is similar to the mandatory one except that
all farmers are now provided with a strictly positive level of pro￿t which allows the agency
to meet the acceptability constraint. When this level of acceptability is high, the regulatory
pattern is quite di⁄erent and entails pooling for a subset of farmers at the equilibrium, due to
the presence of countervailing incentives. The regulatory regime depends on the observable
farm area. We indicate the optimal rule of allocation of satis￿ed farmers according to their
characteristics. Importantly, an acceptable reform amounts to reallocate production towards
less e¢ cient farmers who bene￿t from the reform at the expense of more e¢ cient producers.
In the last part of the paper, we calibrate the model using data from a French watershed
(Don watershed) and we simulate the optimal policy under di⁄erent scenarii concerning the
weight of acceptability constraints from farmers. For this, we elaborate a speci￿c method
to classify farmers along a one dimensional type that represent their productive ability. We
also use the results of a hydrological model calibrated on the watershed in order to estimate
nitrogen emissions. Damages are estimated by computing the retreatment cost necessary to
meet water quality standards actually enforced in Europe (upper limit on nitrogen water
concentration). We show that, on our particular application case, satisfying a high degree of
4acceptability does not entail high welfare losses compared to a low degree of acceptability.
However, the environmental damages varies highly with the level of political support required.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to assumptions and notations and
analysis of regulation under complete information. Regulation when self selection is necessary
is analyzed in section 3 while section 4 is devoted to the empirical application to the Don
watershed. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are relegated into an appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The farmer￿ s behavior
We consider a farmer whose ￿nal output y (say milk) is produced using a quantity s of
land devoted to feed crops and a polluting input such as fertilizers. Let us denote c(y;￿)
the production cost per unit of land. We introduce heterogeneity among farmers through




and that represents the farmer￿ s ability
to transform feed crops into the production of milk. Parameter ￿ can be understood as a
function of several on-farm characteristics (management skills, soil quality, genetic value of
the herd...).
We assume that the cost of production c(:;￿) is increasing convex in y. We also normalize
the set of types by assuming that cost c is decreasing in ￿. In addition, the marginal cost
of producing milk is also decreasing with ability (cy￿ < 0): In other words, a more e¢ cient
farmer (higher type) is also associated with lower optimal rates of input use.2





. Land capacity S is distributed according to land density function h(S) with
cumulative H(S). We also normalize the total land devoted to agriculture to unity. For each
land capacity S, there is a continuum of farmers characterized by their ability, with mass
unity. Farmers are distributed along this line segment according to ability density function
f(￿;S) with cumulative function F(￿;S): We assume that f(￿;S) > 0 for every ￿ and S: Note
2In addition, we make the following technical assumptions: c￿yy < 0, c￿￿y > 0. These assumptions will
help us in obtaining optimal policies that e⁄ectively separate the di⁄erent farmers.
5that we also assume that the set ￿ does not depend on S.3 However, this assumption does





assumed to be strictly increasing in ￿.4
Let us describe the private optimum of the pro￿t-maximising farmer with ability ￿ and
land capacity S, assuming there is no intervention by the environmental agency (status quo
situation). It is given by solving the following program :
max
s;y ￿(s;y;￿) ￿ (py ￿ c(y;￿))s
s.t. s ￿ S
where p is the (exogenous) product price. We assume that market and production conditions
are such that all farms are active in the status quo situation. Hence the constraint s ￿ S
is binding everywhere.5 We denote y￿(￿) as the optimal production level of type-￿ farmer.
Given our assumptions on c(:;:), it is easy to check that both the optimal production level
y￿(￿) and the corresponding pro￿t level ￿￿(￿) are increasing in the farmer￿ s ability ￿.
2.2 The Environmental Agency objective
Agricultural lands not only di⁄er according to their productive e¢ ciency but also in the
environmental impacts of production. We assume that pollution is represented by a pol-
lution production function per hectare, denoted g(y;￿), that estimates the emissions using
simulation models, where g(:;:) is increasing with y and depends on ￿. We do not impose
assumptions on the sign of g￿ that may vary: this is indeed the case on our empirical appli-
cation. As a consequence, a more e¢ cient farmer may or may not pollutes less at the margin
3This assumption can be relaxed but at a much higher cost of complexity for the analysis. In that case, it
is possible to diminish incentives costs because private information is partially veri￿able by the regulator (see
Green and La⁄ont 1986).
4These regularity conditions are made in order to prevent the incidence of ￿pooling￿in the optimal policy
resulting from the probability function, that is policy in which the same allocation is selected for di⁄erent
values of ￿.
5Alternatively, we could have considered that the optimal cropped area s is interior, simply by adding a
￿xed cost k(s) for land in the pro￿t function: ￿(s;y;￿) ￿ (py￿c(y;￿))s￿k(s): This extension is straightforward
and does not modify drastically the features of the optimal policy derived in the paper.







The problem of the regulatory (utilitarian) agency is to maximize a social welfare function
W, written as the sum of taxpayers surplus, the farmers total surplus and the environmental
damage D. We assume that the social cost of pollution D(E) depends on total pollution
emitted and is increasing, convex. Note that we do not include any consideration to the
consumer surplus in the welfare function. As the regulation is implemented on a small
watershed in our empirical application, we expect that any variation in the agricultural
production given the regulation will have negligible impacts on total production sold on the
market.
As emphasized in the introduction, both the land e⁄ectively used and the level of pro-
duction are assumed to be observable and veri￿able by anybody. Suppose that the regulator
requests the ￿-type farmer with land capacity S to produce output y(￿) using land s(￿) ￿ S
and o⁄ers the monetary transfer t(￿):6 The corresponding pro￿t of the ￿-type farmer can be
written as follows:
￿(￿) = (py(￿) ￿ c(y(￿);￿))s(￿) + t(￿) (1)
Note that if the regulator requests s(￿) to be strictly inferior to S then set-aside is part of
the regulatory proposal for a ￿-type farmer with land capacity S. In particular, the regulator
may ￿nd optimal to shut down some farmers by assigning them s(￿) = 0.













where ￿ is the (positive) marginal cost of public funds. Eliminating the transfer t(:) and
6For the purpose of clarity, we omit to condition the allocation {s(￿);y(￿);t(￿)g on the land capacity S.














Finding the optimal policy amounts to ￿nd the land allocation s(:); the production level
y(:) and the net pro￿t ￿(:) (or equivalently the transfer t(:)) that are feasible in a sense to
be precised below and that maximize the welfare function.
2.3 Incentive compatibility and acceptability constraints
Feasible allocations are ￿rst constrained by the information set of the regulator. Information
asymmetry arises from the impossibility for the regulator to identify each farmer￿ s ability.
Alternatively, one may assume that ability is observable but that institutional or political
constraints prevent the regulator from perfectly discriminating farmers on that basis. Thus,
a self-selecting policy remains the only option available to the regulatory agency. Following
the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1982) we can restrict our attention to the set of direct
revelation mechanisms fs(￿);y(￿);t(￿)g￿2￿.
By choosing a particular contract among all o⁄ered contracts, say a production level y(^ ￿),
a forage area s(^ ￿) in exchange of a tax/subsidy t(^ ￿), a farmer implicitly announces to be of
type ^ ￿. Hence, incentive compatibility requires to satisfy the following constraints:
￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;^ ￿); 8￿;8^ ￿ (IC)
where ￿(￿;^ ￿) = ps(^ ￿)y(^ ￿) ￿ s(^ ￿)c(y(^ ￿);￿) + t(^ ￿) and ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;￿), which ensures that any
farmer ￿nds optimal to reveal his true type.
The regulator￿ s problem is to design policies which are not only incentive compatible but
also politically acceptable. Consequently, the regulator has to operate under the additional
constraint that the policy has to be acceptable compared to the status quo policy, and can
therefore be implemented and enforced. This allows the regulator to take into account the
8regulatory history in the agricultural sector before formulating the reform. Following Lewis,
and al. (1989), suppose that only the farmers who bene￿t from the policy will support it,
and that the probability that a farmer will support the policy is strictly positive if only if
his pro￿t after the reform is greater than before, i.e. ￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿). More precisely, we
denote ￿(￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿)) this probability and we assume for simplicity that ￿(:) = 1 whenever
￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿) and 0 either: The political implementation of the policy requires that the





￿(￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿))f(￿;S)d￿h(S)dS ￿ ￿ (AC)
which indicates that the probability that the policy is accepted must be superior to a (exoge-
nous) level ￿ 2 (0;1].7 In addition, we assume that any farmer is free to leave the agricultural
sector following the reform. This implies that the pro￿t obtained after the reform cannot
be lower than the reservation pro￿t. Assuming that the best outside option for any type of
farmer yields a constant (not type dependant) pro￿t, we normalize this reservation pro￿t to
0 and we obtain the following individual rationality constraints:
￿(￿) ￿ 0; 8￿ (IR)
In this setting, the regulator is thus able to enforce its policy as long as it does not entail
any net loss for farmers and provided that a proportion ￿ of farmers gets after the reform at
least the income earned before.
Finally, we impose that the optimal production level after the reform cannot be greater
than the level under the status quo situation (8￿;S; y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿)). Hence we forbid any
re-allocation of production across farmers such that some of them may be given incentives
to produce more than their private optimum absent any regulation. First, we believe that
this constitutes a reasonable property of the optimal policy as it should facilitate political
support for the regulatory intervention given that all farmers have to make some e⁄ort by
reducing production. Second it helps us in deriving the optimal policy as will be clear below.
7This way of modelling political constraints is also recently investigated by Demange and Geo⁄ard (2002)
in a model of physician regulation.
9Given the various constraints faced by the regulator, the program to be solved is as follows:
max
s(:);y(:);￿(:)
W s.t. (IC), (IR), (AC), s(￿) ￿ S and y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) 8￿;S.
Obviously, it is clear that the addition of the acceptability constraint to the regulator￿ s
maximisation program always induces a loss in welfare compared to the situation of a so-
called mandatory policy which is obtained for the special case ￿ = 0. It remains important to
ascertain the qualitative changes in the optimal regulatory policy when ￿ varies. Moreover,
when ￿ = 1, it is also interesting to note that our model belongs to the class of adverse
selection models with type-dependant participation constraints (Jullien (2000)).8 However,
in the general case where ￿ 2 (0;1), the type-dependant participation constraint only applies
to an endogenous subset of types (the ￿winners￿of the reform) which must be identi￿ed as
part of the optimal policy.
2.4 Regulation under complete information
Before analyzing the optimal self-selecting policy, we characterize in this section the optimal
policy under complete information, ignoring incentive compatibility constraints (IC). The
program to be solved is:
max
s(:);y(:);￿(:)
W s.t. (IR), (AC), s(￿) ￿ S and y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) 8￿;S.
Ignoring the constraint y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) for the moment, we di⁄erentiate the objective w.r.t.
y(￿) and we obtain the following necessary conditions:
(1 + ￿)(p ￿ cy(yPI(￿);￿)) = D0 ￿
EPI￿
gy((yPI(￿);￿)) (2)





Equation (2) indicates that for an active farmer the optimal production level yPI(￿) is deter-
mined by equalizing social marginal bene￿t and social marginal damage. Given the linearity
8In this class of adverse selection models, countervailing incentives are generally part of the optimal policy
because of the interaction between the incentive compatibility constraints and the type-dependant participation
constraints. See also Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Cl￿re (1995) for earlier analysis
on countervailing incentives.
10of pro￿t function with respect to the land input, the optimal production does not depend on
the land capacity S. Moreover, it can be checked readily from equation (2) that the optimal
regulation entails a decrease in production per hectare compared to the private optimum (i.e.
yPI(￿) < y￿(￿) for any ￿).





￿(￿) = (1 + ￿)(pyPI(￿) ￿ c(yPI(￿);￿)) ￿ D0 ￿
EPI￿
g(yPI(￿);￿)
denotes the social net marginal surplus of land. We assume that ￿(￿) is increasing and that
￿(￿) > 0 otherwise all farmers should be shut down.9 It follows that when ￿(￿) < 0 there
exists a unique threshold type ￿PI(S) such that for any S, whenever ￿ ￿ ￿PI, the farmer is
not allowed to produce (8S, sPI(￿) = 0, 8￿ ￿ ￿PI(S)). On the contrary, the more e¢ cient
farmers produce using their total land capacity (8S, sPI(￿) = S, 8￿ > ￿PI(S)). Finally,
when ￿(￿) > 0, then all farmers are allowed to produce at the optimum involving complete
information.
To complete the description of the optimal policy under perfect information, it remains
to characterize the redistribution policy (through the transfer) inside the population. As
the objective is decreasing in the rent ￿(￿) left to any agent, it is clear that the regulator
would like to bind all participation constraints at the optimum (￿(￿) = 0, 8￿;8S). Of course,
such a policy is not politically acceptable as long as ￿ is strictly positive. In the limit case
where all farmers must be compensated (￿ = 1), the regulator has to o⁄er a compensation
tPI(￿) = ￿￿(￿)￿ ~ ￿PI(￿) > 0 to any ￿-type farmer (with land size S) where ￿￿(￿) is the pro￿t
before the reform and ~ ￿PI(￿) = (pyPI(￿) ￿ c(yPI(￿);￿)sPI(￿) is the pro￿t gross of transfer
under the reform.








￿(￿) is increasing given that c￿ < 0 and provided that g￿ is negative or not too positive, which is guaranteed
in our empirical application.
11In intermediate cases when 0 < ￿ < 1, the identity of compensated farmers is determined
by the shape of ￿￿(￿)￿~ ￿PI(￿). Unfortunately, this results in very various situations depending
on the model speci￿cation. As we will see now, incomplete information puts more structure
on the shape of the optimal pro￿t and gives clearer predictions on the identity of compensated
farmers.
3 Regulation under incomplete information
The regulator has now to solve the following program:
max
s(:);y(:);￿(:)
W s.t. (IC), (IR), (AC), s(￿) ￿ S and y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) 8￿;S.
Standards arguments (see Guesnerie and La⁄ont, 1984) indicate that incentive constraints
can be replaced by the following set of constraints:
￿0(￿) = ￿c￿(y(￿);￿)s(￿) (IC1)
￿s0(￿)c￿(y(￿);￿) ￿ s(￿)c￿y(y(￿);￿)y0(￿) ￿ 0 (IC2)
Because the rate of growth of rents is positive (￿0(￿) > 0), then participation constraints
reduce to ￿(￿) ￿ 0:
3.1 Preliminary analysis
Denote ya(￿), sa(￿), ￿a(￿) as the optimal second best allocation o⁄ered to any type-￿ farmer
for a given land capacity S. For each land capacity S, we know that the set of farmers allowed




￿ ￿. Now, let us examine the constraint (AC). At
least for some S, the continuous functions ￿a(￿) and ￿￿(￿) must clearly intersect or touch at
least once, otherwise (AC) would be violated or it would not bind, which is suboptimal.
We will proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the optimal policy for a given class
of surface S under the constraint that the proportion of farmers that gain from the reform is
at least ￿(S) which is given, i.e.
Z ￿
￿
￿(￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿))f(￿;S)d￿ ￿ ￿(S).
12Second, we determine the optimal pro￿le for the proportions ￿(S) under the constraint
R S
S ￿(S)h(S)dS = ￿.
For that purpose, let us denote WS the welfare function (partially) restricted to the class





[(1 + ￿)s(￿)(py(￿) ￿ c(y(￿);￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿)]f(￿;S)d￿ ￿ D(E)
















Actually, the following lemma indicates that, for a given S, the function ￿a(￿) intersects
once ￿￿(￿) from above at a point ￿ ￿(S) if ￿(S) is interior.
Lemma 1 For a given S, if ￿(S) 2 (0;1), then
(i) ￿a(￿) intersects ￿￿(￿) once and from above at a point ￿ ￿(S) 2 ￿,
(ii) ￿ ￿(S) satis￿es ￿(S) = F(￿ ￿(S);S).
Proof. see appendix A.
As shown by Lemma 1, it is important to note that incentive compatibility constraints
and the constraint 8￿;S; y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) together imply that the set of farmers who bene￿t
from the reform is composed of the less e¢ cient producers whether they are active or not.
Furthermore, the relative position of the threshold type ￿a(S) and the intersection point ￿ ￿(S)
is crucial for the pattern of the optimal policy. First the function ￿￿(￿) intersects ￿a(￿) on
the ￿ at part of ￿a(￿). This case occurs when ￿(S) is "small" and we have ￿a(S) > ￿ ￿(S).
Then necessarily ￿￿(￿ ￿(S)) = ￿a(￿a(S)). On the contrary, the function ￿￿(￿) intersects ￿a(￿)
on the increasing part of ￿a(￿): This occurs when the proportion ￿(S) is "large" and we have
￿a(S) < ￿ ￿(S). We will successively analyze both cases.
133.2 The case when the proportion ￿(S) is "small"
By a continuity argument, when ￿(S) is "small", we expect that the optimal policy looks like
the optimal mandatory one (i.e. for ￿(S) = 0). This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any S such that ￿(S) is "small", the set of farmers that are allowed to




with ￿a(S) > ￿ ￿(S) and the optimal level of
production for any type (￿;S) farmer is given by:
















Moreover, for any ￿ such that ￿￿ ￿ < ￿a(S), production is not allowed (sa(￿) = 0) and
￿a(￿) = ￿a(￿a(S)) = ￿￿(￿ ￿(S)).
Proof. See appendix B.
As indicated by proposition 1, when ￿(S) is "small", the optimal policy is similar to the
mandatory one (i.e. when ￿(S) is nil), except that the production levels and the range of
excluded farmers are modi￿ed because of the global pollution level Ea which is a priori dif-
ferent. In particular, a positive distortion is added to the marginal damage when determining
the optimal level of production for active farmers. Also, the minimum level of pro￿t is now
higher and equal to ￿￿(￿ ￿(S)) > 0 in order to ful￿ll the acceptability constraint.
Finally, it is obvious that if the optimal repartition of the weights ￿(S) across the classes of
surface is such that ￿(S) is "small" everywhere, then the optimal policy is totally identical to
the mandatory one, except for the basic level of pro￿t given to all farmers. Formally, we would
then have Ea = E￿ and (ya(￿);sa(￿);￿a(S)) = (y￿(￿);s￿(￿);￿￿(S)) for every S. However, the
total welfare level is lower (and decreasing in ￿(S)) compared to the mandatory one because
of the social cost of giving a strictly positive minimum pro￿t to every farmer. To sum up, in
14that particular case, the introduction of the acceptability constraint only implies to translate
upwards the minimum pro￿t level for all farmers and does not change anything else to the
optimal policy nor to the optimal level of pollution.
3.3 The case when the proportion ￿(S) is "large"
We now turn to the opposite case where ￿a(S) < ￿ ￿(S) which occurs when ￿(S) is "large".
The optimal policy in that case is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any S, when ￿(S) is "large", the set of farmers that are allowed to




with ￿a(S) < ￿ ￿(S) and the
optimal level of production for any type (￿;S) farmer is continuous and de￿ned by:









; 8￿ 2 [￿a(S);￿1(S)),
ya(￿) = ￿ y(S); 8￿ 2 [￿1(S);￿2(S)],





















and where ya(￿) denotes the quantities that maximizes WS and with ￿ y(S) maximizing expected
welfare over [￿1(S);￿2(S)] with ￿a(S) ￿ ￿1(S) ￿ ￿ ￿(S) ￿ ￿2(S) ￿ ￿ ￿.. Moreover, for any ￿
such that ￿￿ ￿ < ￿a(S), production is not allowed and ￿a(￿) = ￿a(￿a(S)) > 0.
Proof. See appendix C.
As indicated in the proposition, the output pro￿le is generally not e¢ cient. Indeed,
holding the total level of pollution constant, we ￿nd that ine¢ ciently high levels of production
are induced for low ability types while ine¢ ciently low levels of production are induced for
highly productive farmers. The intuition is as follows. We knows that the acceptability
constraint imposes that ￿a(￿ ￿(S)) = ￿￿(￿ ￿(S)). For all types such that ￿ > ￿ ￿(S), the farmer￿ s
pro￿t increases with its type at the rate of ￿Sc￿ > 0. The agency will thus tend to induce
15lower output on this range in order to limit the rate of growth of informational rents. On the
contrary, for ￿ < ￿ ￿(S), the farmer￿ s pro￿t decreases with its type at the rate of Sc￿ < 0 and
consequently, the agency tends to limit rents by inducing high levels of output. The pooling
interval on [￿1(S);￿2(S)], where all types of farmers are required to produce at the same
constant level ￿ y(S) appears because around ￿ ￿(S) the two tendencies exhibited above would
require that output would decrease with ability which contradicts incentive compatibility
(IC2). Thus, the agency has to induce the same level of production ￿ y(S) in the interval
[￿1(S);￿2(S)] around ￿ ￿(S). Also the farmers in this range receive the same transfer level.
To sum up, the optimal policy involves an intermediary range of types producing the same
level of production which maximize expected welfare while the farmers with lower ability are
required to overproduce and the farmers with higher ability are required to underproduce.
Compared to the situation where acceptability is not required (mandatory policy), it is clear
that political participation induces the agency to reorganize production in a way that bene￿t
to the farmers with low ability. This is because essentially the revenue under status quo
increases more rapidly than the revenue after intervention. Indeed for an active farmer,
under the status quo we have ￿￿0(￿) = ￿Sc￿(y￿(￿);￿) and incentive compatibility requires
that ￿0(￿) = ￿Sc￿(y(￿);￿): Moreover, we have assumed that y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) and c￿ is decreasing
with y. Hence the revenue is more equally distributed in the population, so that the low-
types farmers bene￿t at the expense of high-types farmers. Subsidies given to the low-types
farmers in order to induce them to leave the sector are ￿nanced through implicit taxation of
high-types farmers. However, in our model, it is clear that the total level of pollution always
decreases after intervention. Indeed, given that for any active farmer we have y(￿) ￿ y￿(￿)
and that the range of active farmers is smaller after regulation, total pollution is lower.
3.4 The optimal allocation of proportions ￿(S)
In this subsection, we indicate the rule that determines the optimal allocation of proportions

















We introduce a state variable ￿(S) de￿ned by _ ￿(S) = ￿(S)h(S) with the conditions ￿(S) = 0
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Thus the marginal impact of ￿(S) on expected welfare which is negative should be equalized
across the di⁄erent classes of surface.
4 Empirical application to the Don watershed
For this application, we used the same set of data from dairy farms collected for year 2000 on
the Don watershed (Loire Atlantique, France) by Bontems et al. (2004). We shall summarize
17here the main features of this empirical work.10 First, the critical issue in the application is to
de￿ne a unidimensional measure called ￿ability￿(￿) which allows to reduce the dimensionality
of the set of acute parameters. Second, we have to estimate the density functions h(S) and
f(￿;S) describing the population of farmers. Last, production cost, pollution and damage
cost functions are estimated.
4.1 Determination of parameters
The parameter ￿ represents the ability for a given farmer to transform his forage area into
dairy production. Its determination proceeds in two steps. Firstly, some experts in local
extension services built a relative (one-dimensional) classi￿cation of the surveyed farms, using
observed variables such as the amount of dry matter produced by grasslands, the amount
of milk produced per cow, the balance in forage feed between proteins and energy and the
amount of required concentrates. Secondly these variables have been combined to recover
the classi￿cation proposed by the experts, and hence to determine a function which de￿nes
the one-dimensional parameter ￿. A farmer who manages to obtain high grass yields, who
breeds high productive cows, who gives them good quality forages and who needs low rates of
concentrates to produce milk is considered to possess a good ability to transform his forage
crops into milk, and thus his ￿-parameter is high.
The distributions h(S) and f(￿;S) have been estimated using a discrete approximation of
Beta density functions. Hence, farms are classi￿ed into ten di⁄erent classes of surface while
ability falls into hundred di⁄erent classes for each S.
Following Yiridoe et al. (1997), the amount x(y;￿) of N fertilizer used is expressed as a
quadratic function of production y. The cost function c(y;￿) is then written as follows :
c(y;￿) = w#(￿)x(y;￿) + !(￿)y + %
where w is the inorganic N price, #(￿) is a proportionality factor of fertilizers in forage
operation costs, and !(￿)y + % represents the cost related to breeding operations.
10See Bontems et al. (2004) for more details.
18Moreover, individual emissions have been estimated using a local hydrologic model (Turpin
et al., 2001) from data collected on the surveyed farms and other data concerning soils, hy-
drology and local climate on the Don watershed. Type-dependent emissions have been de-
termined from these estimations, using a quadratic function and a constrained maximum
likelihood method (GouriØroux and Montfort, 1995). Finally, the cost of social damage is
valued as being the cost of water treatment for transforming brut water into drinking water
(Falala, 2002).
4.2 Analysis (to be completed)
Instead of exploiting the ￿rst order conditions exhibited in the theoretical part of this paper,
the optimal policies for the mandatory and the political regulation cases have been more
easily determined by solving the regulator maximisation program directly. For this purpose
we used Gams software (Brooke et al., 1998) and Conopt optimisation procedure (Drud,
1994).
We will present successively the in￿ uence of the required proportion ￿ of winners on
production levels, after tax pro￿ts and welfare. Figure 1 depicts optimal production levels
for di⁄erent scenarios concerning ￿. The depicted situations correspond to Proposition 2
where ￿ is "large". As described in proposition 2, pattern of ya includes two increasing parts
and three pooling zones where all types are o⁄ered the same contract. The ￿rst pooling zone
corresponds to the set of excluded farmers which are the less productive ones (low ￿). In our
application, the range of excluded farmers do not vary highly with ￿. Then, for all active
farmers, the regulatory intervention implies a decrease in production whatever the type and
land capacity, except for a limited range where the constraint ya(￿) ￿ y￿(￿) is binding. For
the lower active types, the gap between the status quo and the optimal production levels is
quite small.
The second pooling phenomenon appears because of the con￿ ict between the acceptability
(AC) and incentive (IC) constraints. Starting from this pooling zone towards the highest type,
19the reform amounts to implement a larger decrease in production than before the pooling
zone. The last pooling zone appears for the higher types of farmers and is due to the binding
of second order conditions (IC2).
To sum up, we have imposed that every farmer must reduce his production level per
hectare (ya(￿) ￿ y￿(￿)) under the reform. We have shown that on our empirical application
an acceptable reform of agri-environmental policy implies to ask more e⁄ort in terms of
production reduction to high types compared to low ones, whatever the land capacity and
the required acceptability level.
Figure 2 depicts pro￿t patterns for a low value of ￿(S) corresponding to proposition 2
and for a high value of ￿(S) corresponding to proposition 3. For low values of ￿(S), the
simulated threshold value ￿ ￿(S) is lower than ￿a(S), which means that some inactive farmers
loose money and this is true also for all active farmers. For high values of ￿(S), ￿a(S) becomes
lower than ￿ ￿(S). Consequently some active farmers now bene￿t from the reform. When ￿(S)
is high, the loss of money imposed to the e¢ cient farmers (￿a ￿￿￿) is lower than for smaller
values of ￿(S).
Moreover the ine¢ cient farmers receive a net subsidy while e¢ cient farmers are taxed :
the e¢ cient farmers bear the cost of the reform.
Figure ? indicates that the optimal proportion ￿(S) (weighted by the density h(S)) is
increasing in ￿ for any class S. To compare di⁄erent cases depending on the proportion
of farmers ￿ who bene￿t from the regulation we use indicators, constructed as a relative
variation between the status quo and the regulated situations. We denote P(￿) the relative














And so are de￿ned V(￿), M(￿), D(￿), the relative variation of welfare, milk production and
damage.
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Figure 2: Farmers pro￿t as a function of ￿-type for several cases : laissez-faire situation (￿￿),
mandatory regulation (￿￿), low and high values of ￿ (￿a).
21of ￿, we have the ￿rst regime for all S and proposition 2 applies, with ya(￿) = y￿(￿) which is
independent of ￿. Thus M(￿) and D(￿) are constant : introducing acceptability constraints
does not change the optimal policy compared to the mandatory case, except for the basic
level of pro￿t given to all farmers. This explains the decreasing level of pro￿t loss (P(￿) is
increasing with respect to ￿). The farmers pay in expectation a tax to the regulator. As a
consequence, the social welfare function is decreasing with respect to ￿.
For values of ￿ higher than ?, Proposition 3 applies for some S and ￿a(S) is strictly
positive. Note that for the application, the monetary value of damage is rather low11 when
compared with farms pro￿t and tax paid by the farmers (Figure 3 depicts variations in
percentage of the status quo level). The evolution of the welfare is mostly drawn by the
variation of pro￿t and transfer.
When ￿ exceeds, then all classes of surfaces fall under Proposition 3. Introducing ac-
ceptability constraints when the proportion ￿ of farmers who bene￿t from the regulation is
growing lead to a decrease of social welfare with ￿.
When ￿ is su¢ ciently high, the status quo situation is prefered by the regulator to inter-
vention (V(￿) becomes non positive). Except for the lower levels of ￿, welfare gain compared
to the status quo does not vary much with the level of acceptability.
5 Conclusion
We have considered a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non
linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along
two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into ￿nal production and the available
area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation
scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We have shown that a
positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection e⁄ects.
By introducing acceptability constraints we show that the intervention under acceptability
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Figure 3: Relative variation with respect to ￿ of damage (￿D), farmers￿pro￿t (￿￿), milk
production (￿y), transfert from farmers to the regulatory agency (￿t) and social welfare
(￿W). The mandatory regulation is not depicted here.
23amounts to reallocate production towards ine¢ cient farmers who bene￿t from the reform
at the expense of e¢ cient producers. Last, we have calibrated the model using datas on
a french watershed (Don watershed). Simulations indicate that satisfying a high degree of
acceptability does not entail high welfare losses compared to low degree of acceptability.
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27Appendix
A Proof of lemma 1
Proof of part (i): Using the envelop theorem, we get before any regulation ￿￿0(￿) = ￿Sc￿(y￿(￿);￿).
As c￿y < 0 and ya(￿) ￿ y￿(￿), we have:
￿c￿(ya(￿);￿) ￿ ￿c￿(y￿(￿);￿)
But we have also sa(￿) ￿ S; so using equation (??) we obtain:
0 ￿ ￿a0(￿) ￿ ￿￿0(￿)
If ￿(S) > 0, then ￿a(￿) intersects ￿￿(￿) once and from above, either on the ￿ at part or on
the increasing part of ￿a(￿).
Proof of part (ii): given (i), for the constraint
R ￿
￿ ￿(￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿))f(￿;S)d￿ ￿ ￿(S) to be
binding at the optimum, ￿ ￿(S) must satisfy ￿(S) =
R ￿ ￿(S)
￿ f(￿;S)d￿ = F(￿ ￿(S);S).
B Proof of proposition 1
Assume that 0 < ￿ ￿(S) < ￿a(S). Then, integrating (IC1), we get:
￿(￿) =
(
￿￿(￿ ￿(S)) for ￿ ￿ ￿a(S)
￿￿(￿ ￿(S)) ￿
R ￿
￿a(S) c￿(y(u);u)s(u)du for ￿ > ￿a(S)
: (3)



































28It remains to maximize WS w.r.t. s(:) and y(:). It is then clear that the optimal allocation
(s(:);y(:)) follows the same rule as the one under a mandatory policy.
We now check that equation IC2 is satis￿ed. For any type-(￿;S) farmer who is allowed
to produce, equation IC2 can be written as:
￿Sc￿y(y(￿);￿)y0(￿) ￿ 0
Derivating the ￿rst-order condition for y with respect to ￿, and dropping any argument,
we get:














This equation can be written as:
y0 =

























< 0. Thus, if in addition g￿y < 0 and gyy > 0, then we have y0(￿) > 0, 8￿ and the
second order conditions are ful￿lled.
C Proof of proposition 2





￿ c￿(y(u);u)s(u)du for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(S)
￿￿(￿ ￿(S)) ￿
R ￿
￿ ￿(S) c￿(y(u);u)s(u)du for ￿ > ￿ ￿(S)
(5)



















































Before derivating (6), note that the expression of the derivatives will depend on whether
￿ is greater or lower than ￿ ￿(S).
C.1 Analysis for ￿ < ￿ ￿(S)
For ￿ < ￿ ￿(S), derivating (6) with respect to y(￿), we obtain the following ￿rst-order condition
for an (interior) optimum:
@WS
@y(￿)




Similarly, with respect to s(:), we obtain the following expression for the social marginal
surplus of land :
@WS
@s(￿)








Using (7) and dropping any argument, we get from (8) :











Note that when c￿￿ is small with respect to the other terms, B0(￿) > 0. Assuming B(￿) < 0
and B(￿) > 0, there exists a unique threshold type ￿a(S) such that for every ￿ < ￿a(S),
30@WS=@s(￿) < 0 and consequently sa(￿) = 0 so that all su¢ ciently ine¢ cient farmers are
shut down. Moreover, for any ￿ > ￿a(S); @WS=@s(￿) > 0 and consequently sa(￿) = S. The
threshold type separating active from inactive farmers is given by:
(1 + ￿)(pya(￿a(S)) ￿ c(ya(￿a(S));￿a(S)))f(￿a(S);S)
￿ D0 (Ea)g(ya(￿a(S));￿a(S))f(￿a(S);S) = ￿c￿(ya(￿a(S));￿a(S))F(￿a(S);S)
This equation means that the regulator equalizes the marginal surplus (net of damage)
of keeping active the type-￿a(S) farmers with the corresponding incentive cost for all smaller
type farmers (in proportion F(￿a(S);S)).
C.2 Analysis for ￿ > ￿ ￿(S)
For ￿ > ￿ ￿(S), derivating (6) w.r.t y(￿) yields to:




Once again, the optimal production level follows the same rule as for the optimal manda-
tory policy and for the optimal policy when ￿(S) is "small".
C.3 Pooling around ￿ ￿(S)
From (7) and (9), it is clear that ya(￿) decreases discontinuously at ￿ = ￿ ￿(S) (that is,
lim￿!￿ ￿(S)￿ ya(￿) > lim￿!￿ ￿(S)+ ya(￿)). Thus, it is not possible to implement ya(￿) without
violating incentive compatibility constraints (more precisely (??)). The optimal policy in-
volves pooling with ya(￿) = ￿ y(S) in a neighborhood [￿1(S);￿2(S)] around ￿ ￿(S) (Lewis and
Sappington, 1989).
It remains to determine ￿1(S);￿2(S) and ￿ y(S) . First, it is easy to show that ya(￿) is
continuous (see Lewis and Sappington (1989)). Then, rewriting the pro￿t function for any









￿1(S) c￿(￿ y(S);u)sa(u)du pour ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(S)
￿￿(￿ ￿(S)) ￿
R ￿2(S)
￿ ￿(S) c￿(￿ y(S);u)sa(u)du ￿
R ￿
￿2(S) c￿(ya(u);u)sa(u)du pour ￿ > ￿ ￿(S)
31Denote AW(s(￿);y(￿);￿) = (1 + ￿)s(￿)(py(￿) ￿ c(y(￿);￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿) ￿ D(E): Then WS =
R ￿
￿ [AW(sa(￿);ya(￿);￿)]f(￿;S)d￿: Di⁄erentiating WS with respect to ￿ y(S), we get:
dWS
d￿ y(S)
=
Z ￿2(S)
￿1(S)
@AW(sa(￿); ￿ y(S);￿)
@y
f(￿;S)d￿ = 0:
32